The past decades have seen an increasing amount of intra-State wars unfold. The term 'terrorism' has increasingly become a license for States to unilaterally conduct their action. Because of that, determining the applicable legal norms that delimit the State's military power and regulate the warring parties' conducts is of ultimate importance. Although the legal test for the applicability of international humanitarian law in noninternational armed conflict has been largely settled -first found in the second Protocol additional to the Geneva Convention and second supplemented by international tribunals as declaratory of customary IHL -terrorism has caused much frustration in the course of such legal determination, not helped by the obscure facts on the ground. This article will argue that by subjectively classifying a situation as 'terrorism' the State has not displaced the applicability question. In fact, the impact that terrorism has on the legal assessment is minimal, if any.
Introduction
Traditionally, law enforcement is for States to regulate violence occurring within its domestic sphere. If such violence escalates to a sufficient intensity between the State and an organised armed group, the situation may fall under the ambit of international humanitarian law (IHL). The applicability of IHL is definable by the legal existence of an armed conflict. Today, asymmetrical warfare and terrorism have drastically changed the academic discourse because the search for an 'armed conflict' is no longer so clear-cut. It thus leaves much political discretion for States to opt for a law enforcement paradigm in response to terrorism. This article will examine the impact that terrorism has on the legal establishment of non-international armed conflict (NIAC). The need to focus on NIAC is manifested in the frequent commission of terrorist acts and the label of '(counter-)terrorism' in these situations. It will begin by recalling the essential elements in establishing NIAC and the challenges that can already be identified in relation to terrorism. The article will then go on to discuss the relationship between IHL and law enforcement with regard to terrorism. Most often, the State's choice has frustrated the applicable paradigms. Lastly, this analysis will show that such a frustration comes from a lack of understanding of the role of terrorism in establishing NIAC.
I. The Beginning of a Non-International Armed Conflict
In search for the correct legal paradigm applicable to a situation of terrorism, it is necessary to first address the question of whether IHL is applicable, that is, whether an armed conflict can be legally established. It is proper to inquire firstly into IHL's applicability because in an armed conflict, IHL prevails over a national legal framework. 1 Article 2(2) of the second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (AP II) negatively defines a NIAC by excluding violence of insufficient intensity.
To determine the existence of a NIAC, the sources of law include treaty law and customary IHL. The latter has been interpreted and applied by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Tadić decision. Despite the clear nonexhaustive list of indicators provided by the Appeals Chamber, difficulties abound, the situation is not helped by the fact that terrorist acts often possess characteristics that make the evidence on the ground obscure.
A. Treaty Law
The starting point in treaty law to define NIAC can be found in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
2 It refers to 'armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Party'. Depending on the situation at hand, hostilities may occur between governmental armed forces and nonState armed groups, or between such groups only.
Separately, Article 1 of the AP II excludes from NIAC 'situations of internal disturbance and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature.' 3 Instead, AP II offers a narrow definition of NIAC -the armed conflict shall: take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organised armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a party of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.
This enunciates a more restrictive scope than Common Article 3. Firstly, it contains the cumulative requirements for responsible command 4 State armed groups. Second, it excludes conflicts arising solely between non-State armed groups but envisages the involvement of governmental forces. 6 Lastly, the words 'in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces' implies that, in order for IHL to apply to a State's armed forces, those forces must be present in the territory of that State. 7 Hence, it undermines the applicability of IHL to State armed forces operating extraterritorially.
It is noted, however, that the more restrictive criteria present in AP II do not in any way modify the content of Common Article 3. 8 Rather, the definitions of both regimes are complementary, the differences of which had later been brought closer by the Tadić decision. The often-cited Tadić decision is instrumental in elaborating on the content of Common Article 3. Considered to propound the legal norms in Common Article 3 as reflective of customary IHL, 11 the Appeals Chamber interpreted NIAC as a situation of 'protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups within a State. ' 12 This formulation has a two-pronged test of thresholds as to: 1. the intensity of violence and 2. the degree of organisation of the nonState armed group. 13 suggested that the territory does not have to be substantial nor the control stable: see e. 14 It is worth noting that terrorist acts may also be factored in this intensity threshold, which will be discussed in the next section.
These indicative factors are nonetheless non-exhaustive, as one still needs to proceed to assess the existence of a NIAC by reference to the overall context. 15 It is an objective determination without the need to resort to the State's declaration. 16 ii. Degree of Organisation of Non-State Armed Groups The ICTY has also set out useful indicators to determine whether a certain non-State armed group is sufficiently organised to be considered a party to an armed conflict. These include, inter alia, the existence of a command structure within the group; its control over a certain territory; its ability to gain access to weapons, other military equipment, recruits and military training; and its ability to plan, coordinate and carry out military operations, including troop movements and logistics. 17 As far as terrorism is concerned, the motivation of or the purpose advanced by the group is irrelevant. 18 In the situation of Syria, the main opposition armed group, the Free Syrian Army, is composed of insurgents who have carried out coordinated attacks. They were capable of controlling certain parts of the territory, including northern Syrian and towns around Damascus. 19 An opposite example is Al-Qaeda, which does not control a certain territory and operates across borders. 20 
C. Challenges of Establishing the Existence of NIACs
At this stage, we can already identify profound difficulties in establishing the existence of NIAC from the Tadić formulation. Further, each of the two criteria can be prone to the terrorist aspect of a conflict.
At the outset, the Haradinaj case requires that a non-State armed group must achieve the requisite degree of organisation so that it can engage in military activities of a certain intensity but not merely sporadic attacks. At times, States would subjectively classify a group as 'rebels' or 'terrorists'. In the past, these were the Kurdistan Workers' Party in Turkey, 21 the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia in Colombia 22 and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka. 23 But again, a State's declaration has no legal impact on the qualification of the parties to a conflict.
Rather, a question that often baffles international lawyers is how far we can include a non-State armed group's affiliates. IHL does not have a clear answer. Pejić looks at whether the affiliation to the core group is merely ideological or if military operations can be autonomously conducted by the affiliates. 24 In the second situation, the affiliates may be deemed 'co-belligerents' in the same armed conflict. 25 In the example of Al-Qaeda, its structure has been increasingly decentralised and degraded. The fact that its offshoots were involved in sporadic attacks in Iraq or Yemen does not warrant the conclusion that one single NIAC exists on its own. 26 In the words of Milanović, one simply cannot aggregate all terrorist acts motivated by Islamic fundamentalism coupled with professed allegiance to Al-Qaeda all across the world in order to satisfy the twofold intensity and organization test. Under international law, the mere fact that an international border has been crossed does not absolve the parties of their IHL obligations, much less permitting the deprivation of civilian protection. 28 In a situation where the non-State armed group from State A crosses the border to the territory of State B, there are two possibilities. First, if the sporadic violence within State B is in itself insufficient to trigger the application of IHL, domestic legal orders would fill the regulatory gap. 29 Second, in case a sufficient nexus can be established between the military operations in State B and the ongoing NIAC in State A, those operations can nonetheless be attributed to become part of the overall armed conflict. 30 In a similar vein, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has stated that, one can merge the cross-border violence if it is 'closely related to the hostilities occurring in other parts of the territories controlled by the parties to the conflict'. 31 The Taliban fighting that spread from Afghanistan onto the Pakistani territory is a case in point.
II. The Legal Relationship Between IHL, Law Enforcement and Terrorism
It is proper now to introduce law enforcement given the extent to which it might confuse the applicability of IHL. The challenges of establishing the existence of a NIAC for IHL to apply are heightened by the State's desire to prioritise law enforcement. As a matter of applicable paradigms, although IHL and law enforcement can theoretically be coextensive, they do provide competing protection standards. Insofar as a counter-terrorism operation is conducted within the realm of law enforcement, it does not immediately negate the classification of the situation as a NIAC.
32 From the perspective of the sovereign State, specific rules governing a conflict situation must be selected. This frontline discretion left to the State to decide the applicable paradigm as they see fit often leads to collateral ramifications. 33 In the view of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 'the law is not a question of choice, but based on the situation.'
34 It added that:
They [the authorities] cannot choose to switch freely from one legal framework to the other as it suits them. The application will depend on objective criteria as to whether the overall situation qualifies as an armed conflict or not and whether the action taken is directed against a legitimate target and can therefore be considered as part of the conduct of hostilities or as a normal law enforcement activity.
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For this reason, we will now look at the competing nature of IHL and law enforcement as legal paradigms in response to terrorism, and some examples of their frustrated application.
A. Differentiating IHL and Law Enforcement
At risk of oversimplification, law enforcement denotes the legal regime containing a set of legal norms applicable during law enforcement operations. These norms are often times derivable from domestic legal orders and encompass, in particular for our purposes, criminal law provisions prohibiting terrorist offences, constitutional law ensuring human rights protection and administrative law which delimits the scope of authority of the State agent. One can further distil the law applicable to law enforcement from international law, including international human rights law (IHRL). In principle, IHL and law enforcement bear marked differences. Firstly, IHL is characterised by a horizontal relationship between parties to the conflict. 37 The ultimate aim of military operations is to prevail over the enemy's armed forces, 38 whereas under law enforcement the relationship between the State and individuals is vertical, typical of the enforcement of domestic legislation. 39 Although law enforcement agents can derogate from human rights in "emergency" situations, 40 one cannot simply shift the scope and content of obligations by rhetorically avoiding the IHL paradigm. This is despite the blurred separation in practice when the same State agency has the authority to carry out both hostilities and law enforcement activities. 41 Secondly, the two paradigms answer the question of the applicability of legal norms at differing stages. By placing counter-terrorism responses in a purely terrorism context, the legal norms of the law enforcement paradigm -often a mix of IHRL and domestic criminal law -automatically apply and guide the subsequent judicial assessment on any human rights violations. The applicability of IHL, on the other hand, depends on the existence of an armed conflict, which is a legal determination ex post facto by a competent judicial body. 42 Lastly, from a protection perspective, IHL and law enforcement entail discrepancies in their protection standards. Take detention incommunicado as an example. Under IHL, holding persons at 'black sites' is only lawful if necessary for military advantages in relation to and for the duration of the conflict at hand. 43 Detainees shall be tried before an independent and impartial military tribunal and be repatriated as soon as the hostilities end. 44 In a NIAC situation, in addition to the Common Article 3 standards, AP II lays down fundamental guarantees for the treatment of detainees. 45 In contrary, IHRL requires detention to be necessary and proportionate to preventing a person's commission of offences or for prosecution purposes. 46 Holding a person incommunicado, however, is unlawful by definition due to the lack of procedural guarantees relating to the right to liberty and associated fair trial rights. 45 Additional Protocol II, Article 4 on humane treatment of persons detained, and Article 5 on minimum provisions for the treatment of persons interned, detained or deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict). 46 See ICCPR, Article 9 and ECHR, Article 5. 47 See ICCPR, Article 9(3); ECHR, Article 5(3), Article 6.
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B. The Significance of the Applicability Question Clearly, the question of which paradigm is applicable to the situation at hand is necessary to determine the set of legal norms when later adjudicating on specific legal issues. The distinct ways of prosecuting terrorists in each paradigm has direct bearing on the postconflict transitional justice through accountability of all parties concerned. During an armed conflict, where IHL (and IHRL with certain restrictions) 48 is applicable, attacks towards military personnel and objectives may be lawful, provided that the means employed does not cause unnecessary suffering to the enemy's soldiers. 49 This is regardless of whether the attack is performed by the State or the non-State armed group, in line with the principle of equality of belligerents.
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Terrorist acts committed by either party to a NIAC and in connection with the armed conflict are considered a grave breach to the AP II and customary IHL and thus, they are prosecuted as war crimes. 51 More specifically, Article 4(2)(d) and Article 13(2) of the AP II provide that violent acts intended to spread terror among a civilian population or individuals are prohibited 'at any time and in any place'. It should be noted, as it has been specified in Articles 3(d) and 4(d) of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), that terrorist acts are a serious violation of AP II and Common Article 3 applicable to NIAC. The jurisprudence of the SCSL also reflects this position.
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On the other hand, in a situation falling short of an armed conflict due to the insufficient intensity of violence or organisation of the non-State armed group, this would not create a legal void. Under the umbrella of Article 2(2) of the AP II, namely 'internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature', 53 law enforcement appears to be the appropriate paradigm for legal regulation. Under it, any (terrorist) attack against military objects or civilian populations are automatically deemed unlawful. 54 Therefore, the overarching question is where do we draw a dividing line between IHL and law enforcement? Apparently, establishing the beginning of a NIAC is the starting point. Attached to it is the blurring of such a legal determination due to the characteristics of terrorism we have discussed. But before attempting to offer an answer, we need to appreciate the escalated frustration due to the mere choice by the State for a law enforcement paradigm. 
C. The Frustration of Applicable Paradigms in Response to Terrorism
The frustration and sometimes incorrect application of paradigms is attributable to the State's unwillingness to recognise the applicability of IHL. With less control over the situation, a State fighting in accordance with IHL rules is forced to recognise the nonState armed group as a legitimate party to a NIAC. The intensity threshold required for a NIAC also implies the State's inability to contain the spiralling violence within its own territory. As a consequence, IHL categorically endorses the legal entitlement of the nonState armed group to use lethal force to advance their military position against State agents under jus in bello. 55 Hence, States generally prefer a domestic law enforcement framework, which provides more latitude in their criminalising and prosecuting 'terrorists', so to speak. 56 Still, in recent decades, we have seen a gradual change in the attitude of States when it comes to their extraterritorial counter-terrorism operations. The decision of the United States to conduct drone strikes in Afghanistan, for instance, was made coupled with an IHL-regulated mandate. 57 One plausible explanation is that IHL permits the use of lethal force provided that proportionality is satisfied, whereas a law enforcement paradigm would almost certainly render such lethal force unlawful under IHRL.
We have noted that the determination of the existence of a NIAC is ex post facto. Insofar as counter-terrorism responses are concerned, it is easier for States to put in place law enforcement within the domestic legal bounds, regardless of whether an armed conflict could have been established. The borderline situations are exemplified by the law enforcement units deployed by the United Kingdom in Northern Ireland to curb 'The Trouble' movement until the 1998 Belfast Agreement, as well as Russia's punitive measures against the Chechen insurgents participating in the hostilities.
To add to the complexity, there are other situations where States would co-apply both IHL and law enforcement. One example are the Israel/Palestine checkpoints, an occupation case which attracts the application of IHL. Nonetheless, the Rules of Engagement for the Israel Defence Forces regulate lethal force through the law of selfdefence, as imaginably influenced by IHRL. This has dismissed the soldier's obligation to apply status-based judgment under IHL. Likewise, the Israel Supreme Court has demanded the 'capture-before-kill' principle in targeted killing cases, making specific legal issues in the occupied territory more aligned to IHRL. 58 Another example is the co-execution of conducting hostilities and law enforcement operations by the same State agents in Colombia. During the conflict with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Colombian armed forces were provided with multi-coloured cards instructing whether the current operation falls within the context of the NIAC or law enforcement. 59 It becomes extremely difficult to draw a dividing line between those military operations executed against insurgents in the NIAC, and those executed against ordinary criminals. 60 Even though a State may wish to deploy law enforcement agents in an armed conflict, they cannot opt out of IHL rules. 61 However, the State may run the risk of losing IHL protections to law enforcement agents if those agents are considered part of the de facto armed forces by IHL. 62 
III. The Dividing Line Between IHL and Law Enforcement
Returning to our point of departure, namely, where to draw the dividing line between the two paradigms, it is necessary to assess the validity of the claim by States that a situation of terrorism of itself can negatively impact the applicability of IHL. In doing so, it is perhaps most helpful to examine the role of terrorism based on the two-pronged test in Tadić.
A. Identification of Parties
Often times, States tend to qualify a non-State armed group as a 'terrorist group' so as to delegitimize the group, deny the existence of a NIAC, and reject the applicability of IHL. This trend has led to increasing criminalization under the national legal framework without amnesty. On the contrary, Common Article 3 puts the emphasis that the applicability of IHL rules 'shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict. Parallel to the indicators identified in Haradinaj, the Trial Chamber in the Boškoski case again emphasized that the non-State armed group must have 'some hierarchical structure' and must be able to implement the basic obligations of Common Article 3. 65 In any case, if a State believes that an alleged terrorist group does not possess a sufficient degree of organisation, they cannot conduct military operations against it. Clearly, they cannot create a war against a non-existing adversary party. 66 It bears repeating that the assessment of the degree of the group's organization must objectively consider the facts on the ground. 67 In this sense, Colombia and Ireland are two cases in point.
i. Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)
In the case of Colombia, the government has repeatedly denied the existence of a NIAC on its territory, opting to define the hostilities as part of a 'war on terror' instead. On the contrary, numerous international bodies, including the ICRC and Amnesty International have consistently defined the situation in Colombia as a NIAC and the FARC as an 'armed opposition group.' 68 In order to establish its jurisdiction, the International Criminal Court (ICC) had unequivocally concluded 'a reasonable basis to believe that war crimes […] have been committed in the context of the non-international armed conflict in Colombia' between November 2009 and November 2002. 69 Legally speaking, despite the frequent listing of the FARC as a 'terrorist organisation', 70 it does not undermine the factual determination that the group 'exhibits a sufficient degree of organisation, and have engaged in sustained military hostilities against the Colombian government.' 71 The FARC had a well-established command structure with a Commander in Chief, Secretariat, Central High Command, Bloc, Front, Column, Company, Guerrilla and Squad. It also possessed a system for firearms and ammunition, effective control over part of the territory of Colombia, and official Rules of Engagement. This degree of organisation had enabled the FARC to carry out attacks causing civilian damages. In a period of 10 years, between 15,000 and 30,000 people have been victims of enforced disappearances, while more than 20,000 people were kidnapped or taken hostage. 72 More than 70,000 people, the vast majority of whom were civilians, have been killed as a result of the conflict. 73 ii. Irish Republican Army (IRA) 'The Troubles' movement in Northern Ireland is another prime example of how States subjectively rejected the status of a non-State armed group, denied the applicability of IHL, and adopted a law enforcement paradigm to counter terrorism. The IRA has been labelled as 'terrorist' since the 1970s when it was founded. 74 The group however explicitly considered themselves as a national liberation movement engaged in a war for self-determination from a foreign army. 75 Even though the United Kingdom Home Secretary and the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland once stated that the authorities were 'at war' with the IRA, they categorically denied the existence of an armed conflict. 76 In constructing their narrative, the British government called the violence a 'civil conflict' of a strong criminal nature, which the national law enforcement agents were authorised to deal with. 77 This was followed by the United Kingdom's ratification of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols. At the same time, it produced an understanding that an armed conflict excludes ordinary crimes, including acts of terrorism. 78 The understanding failed to contemplate that terrorism may occur in times of armed conflict. 79 It was obvious that the IRA had an effective command structure, including an Army Council. They were also able to conduct armed operations in Northern Ireland, Britain and other parts of Western Europe, and they had control over certain parts of Londonderry and Belfast. 80 Their degree of organisation is also manifested in the ability to ultimately declare a ceasefire subsequent to the Canary Wharf and Manchester bombings in 1997. 81 Later on, these factors were countered by the fragmentation of the group in 1969 due to conflicting ideologies. Hence, it had become difficult to identify the party participating in the hostilities. 82 But insofar as establishing the beginning of a NIAC is concerned, the proper paradigm to subject both parties in their operations appeared to be IHL. 83 
B. Intensity of Violence
The legal existence of a NIAC requires 'protracted armed violence' which denotes a minimum level of intensity to distinguish itself from internal disturbances. 84 In the case of Haradinaj, the term 'protracted armed violence' has also been interpreted as 'referring more to the intensity of the armed violence than to its duration.' 85 With regard to the increasing use of counter-terrorism law enforcement, it is helpful to recall that the ICTY, reached the European Court of Human Rights, the Court analysed the violations in IHRL terms, not because Russia had unilaterally classified the situation as domestic, but because the hostage-taking of the Moscow theatre occurred outside the battlefield. 94 Of course, this approach was not without criticism. 95 
Conclusion
The determination of the applicable paradigm drastically impacts who a State may or may not kill. The extensive ramifications continue beyond the hostilities to the criminal proceedings that seek to determine post-conflict accountability. Given the increasing amount of intra-State wars, tactics of terrorism and civilian casualties, the stake now is higher than ever.
This article has shown that the determination of NIAC is not without its inherent difficulties. This is yet further frustrated by not only the characteristics of terrorism, but also the intentional use of the law enforcement paradigm at the disposal of States in lieu of IHL. But as we have seen, terrorist acts of violence do not simply fall within the hands of law enforcement because they are terrorist in nature. Judicial assessment remains as such that it resorts to the factual determination on the ground. In this sense, the impact of terrorism on the legal establishment of armed conflicts and hence the applicability of IHL, if any, has proven minimal. * www.grojil.org
